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Introduction
The dominant economic theory, neoclassical economics, employs a single economic 
evaluative criterion: effi  ciency. Moreover, it assigns this criterion a very specifi c meaning. 
Other – heterodox – schools of thought in economics tend to use more open concepts of 
effi  ciency, related to common sense understandings of cost-saving and preventing waste. 
Also, to assess the state of an economy, heterodox schools of thought tend to draw upon 
additional evaluative criteria, such as stability, equity and sustainability. Economics’ 
widespread concern with effi  ciency is, of course, implied in the well-known defi nition of 
the subject as ‘the study of the allocation of scarce resources to alternative ends’. Here, the 
aspect regarded as mattering most is simply which allocation of resources helps to achieve 
the most ends.
However, effi  ciency has not always dominated economic evaluation. For Adam Smith, 
a good economy was characterized not only by effi  ciency in exchange, but also by moral 
sentiments underlying the functioning of markets. A market economy, Smith argued in 
his Wealth of Nations, should combine effi  ciency and equity: ‘It is but equity, besides, 
that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a 
share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed 
and lodged’ (Smith [1776] 1981, p. 96). John Stuart Mill considered a good economy one 
that provides freedom for all agents, including the socially and politically marginalized, 
such as women. This requires not only the negative freedom of markets, but also positive 
freedom, guaranteed by entitlements, such as embodied in the Poor Laws in England 
which Mill ([1848] 1917, pp. 754–7) defended in Principles of Political Economy. For 
Karl Marx ([1867] 1969), to mention a third classical economist, an economy that would 
allow exploitation of labour through unequal ownership of resources was a bad economy, 
because it limited the freedom of a whole class to own the product of its labour. Classical 
economists, hence, regarded freedom, justice and equality as equally important criteria 
for economic evaluation.
It was only in the twentieth century that effi  ciency came to dominate economic evalua-
tion through the development of welfare economics by economists such as Arthur Pigou 
and Vilfredo Pareto. Welfare economics, of course, could not exist without a measure of 
welfare, and these thinkers opted for a utilitarian approach. The consequentialist ethics 
of utilitarianism is concerned with what Jeremy Bentham phrased ‘the greatest happi-
ness for the greatest number’. Today, ‘Pareto effi  ciency’ is widely used in economics. It 
refers to the situation in which no one can be made better off  without making anyone else 
worse off  – irrespective of who would be aff ected or to what extent. So, only total utility 
counts, not its distribution. This prohibition of interpersonal utility comparisons rules 
out redistribution and invokes a strong form of the liberal ‘no-harm principle’; that is, 
any redistribution that harms at least one person is regarded as morally bad, irrespective 
of the good it would bring to others. Hence, Pareto effi  ciency is not a morally neutral 
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criterion but expresses a strong liberal – even libertarian – ethics through the application 
of a strict no-harm principle towards redistribution.
Critiques of Pareto effi  ciency
Utilitarianism and the prohibition of interpersonal utility comparisons
As explained above, Pareto effi  ciency has been defi ned in utilitarian terms, through the 
development of welfare economics. Utility is a fully commensurable individual measure 
of well-being that assumes individuals maximize their utility by satisfying their prefer-
ences. In other words, they follow their self-interest, even when satisfying other-directed 
preferences: altruism exists only when it increases the utility of the altruist to a larger 
extent than self-directed actions would have done, with given prices and constraints. As 
a consequence of the entirely individualistic subjective utility space of evaluation, Pareto 
effi  ciency ignores a more social and political, or democratic, assessment of valued ends, 
capacities and eff orts of economic agents.
So, in the widely applied criterion of Pareto effi  ciency, redistribution of resources is 
only allowed as long as it makes at least one person better off  without making anyone 
else worse off . No redistribution is allowed if even one person would become worse 
off , regardless of whether that one person would be only a bit worse off , whereas many 
others would benefi t. In other words, equity is portrayed as a trade-off  with effi  ciency. 
The logic behind this trade-off  is that if the state were to tax the income (or land or any 
other resource) of the rich and pass the proceeds on as a subsidy to the poor, this would 
create disincentives, decreasing effi  ciency. The rich would no longer be willing to invest to 
innovate and expand if the marginal benefi ts of that eff ort were taxed away. The poor, on 
the other hand, would no longer do their best to fi nd employment, be entrepreneurial and 
work hard, because they would receive welfare support anyway. This logic clearly rests on 
a reductionistic view of humans as entirely self-interested with a dislike of work – indeed, 
the assumption of economic rationality in neoclassical economics.
Surprisingly, the subjective and individualistic straitjacket of Pareto effi  ciency may not 
actually promote the most effi  cient outcome for an economy. This can be explained with 
the help of the principle of diminishing marginal returns, which states that a last added 
unit generates less value than a previously added unit (of a production factor, income 
or consumer good). Now, applying this to total utility, it may well be that when some 
resources are shifted from those with low marginal utilities (generally the rich) to those 
with high marginal utilities (generally the poor), total utility would increase because of a 
more effi  cient resource use. The poor would benefi t more from such redistribution than 
the rich would lose. Hence, with given resources, more total utility could be achieved. 
But the defi nition of Pareto effi  ciency does not allow such redistribution, even though in 
resource terms it would be more effi  cient – resulting as it does in more total utility with 
the same amount of resources. This leads to the conclusion that Pareto effi  ciency is not 
really about maximum effi  ciency, but rather about relative maximum utility, that is, total 
utility constrained by a strong no-harm principle. In other words, Pareto effi  ciency allows 
for the waste of resources – land, food or health care – by the affl  uent.
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Perfect competition
The fi rst fundamental welfare theorem holds that Pareto effi  ciency occurs in a situ-
ation of perfect competition. Now, perfect competition occurs in an ideal market 
without externalities, barriers to entry or exit or economies of scale. Obviously, 
real-world markets are almost never perfectly competitive. Markets often create 
externalities, exhibit collusion or value-chain control by fi rms or generate increas-
ing returns to scale leading to monopolistic tendencies. Hence, Pareto effi  ciency is 
largely a theoretical construct with very little relation to real markets. Moreover, 
as Amartya Sen (1987) explained so well, in the real world, economic agents do 
not behave like the typical neoclassical ‘rational economic man’ – they do not act 
exclusively competitively, pursuing their own interests. Real-world economic agents 
also care for others and follow norms of justice, and therefore also help to further 
the well-being of others, sometimes even at the cost of their own well-being. Hence, 
as Walter Schultz (2001) recognized, economic behaviour has a morally laden inter-
personal dimension which is not captured by the fi rst fundamental welfare theorem. 
Agents need to have particular moral characteristics – rights and responsibilities – in 
order to bring about and support perfectly competitive markets. In particular, agents 
need to refrain from free-riding, resist blocking others from participation and not be 
tempted to dump external costs on third parties. Self-interest is clearly not enough 
for markets to fl ourish and effi  ciency to emerge.
In addition to the abovementioned assumptions about perfect competition, the 
one-to-one relationship between Pareto effi  ciency and perfect competition in the fi rst 
fundamental welfare theorem builds on a hidden assumption as well. This is the limita-
tion of effi  ciency to the realm of exchange, while assuming that exchange by defi nition 
is benefi cial for both parties. The applicability of Pareto effi  ciency to other realms 
of the economy – such as the supply of public goods by the state or unpaid transac-
tions within and between households – is very limited (except in the case of so-called 
‘market failures’). This excludes much of women’s work from welfare analysis, as such 
work largely takes place unpaid in households, creating a gender bias in the concept 
of Pareto effi  ciency (Barker 1995). At the same time, the market-only focus of Pareto 
effi  ciency regards public goods as, at most, second-best compared to market supply. 
Pareto effi  ciency takes for granted that agents will be able to survive when exchange in 
perfectly competitive markets is not mutually benefi cial. In other words, Pareto effi  ciency 
assumes that autarky – self-reliance – is always a feasible option, living off  of one’s 
wealth, savings, own-account production or access to commons, in cases where possible 
exchanges do not satisfy both parties. This is what Sen (1981) called ‘trade-independent 
security’. Distress sales may be regarded by libertarians as voluntary in a static sense, 
but they undermine an agent’s resource base and hence crowd out productive capacity in 
the long run. This is generally not effi  cient in a dynamic sense, making people dependent 
on others or the state. In the real world, without perfect markets, but with the impor-
tant infl uence of power and uncertainty, most people who experience a disadvantaged 
exchange position have very few resources to live from, except their labour power. 
Hence, many people have no trade-independent security. Even their labour may not be 
in demand. Due to a lack of nutrition and health (Dasgupta 1993), one’s labour may not 
earn suffi  cient market value for survival (Kurien 1996). Or a combination of factors may 
lead to low demand for labour, including lack of aggregate demand (Walsh 1996).
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Hence, the strong no-harm principle of libertarianism benefi ts the status quo of the 
distribution of endowments, which, however, does not necessarily imply the most effi  cient 
allocation of resources from a dynamic perspective.
Compensation
The second fundamental welfare theorem, that of the Kaldor-Hicks compensation, is an 
addition to Pareto effi  ciency that allows for some form of redistribution. This is limited to 
a lump-sum redistribution of resources from winners (those who gain from free markets) 
to losers (those who, temporarily or due to exogenous shocks to the economy, do not 
gain from exchange), to the extent that winners keep a net advantage in order to buy the 
losers’ cooperation, that is, their voluntary exchange. The objective of such redistribution 
is not so much fairness between winners and losers in the optimum but the feasibility of 
reaching the optimum from a political economy perspective.
Again, this theorem is an entirely theoretical construct. In the real world it is unlikely that 
winners will suffi  ciently compensate losers, because of the diff erence in bargaining power 
between the two groups. So it is unlikely that prices will change in order to seduce losers into 
the exchange (for example, with higher wages) or that the winners will accept a tax rise for 
the benefi t of the losers. The existence of winners and losers in free markets itself creates a dif-
ference in bargaining power, so that the losers, without having adequate trade-independent 
security, are unlikely to be compensated for their cooperation with the winners.
In conclusion, these three critiques indicate that Pareto effi  ciency is not at all a value-
neutral evaluative criterion, but one strongly intertwined with values. Pareto effi  ciency 
favours the status quo of competitive market outcomes based on given distributions, 
relying on a strong no-harm principle which disallows any eff ective form of redistribu-
tion, while measuring effi  ciency in total utility outcome, rather than minimum resource 
use, thus condoning various forms of waste.
Cost-benefi t analysis
Since utility is unmeasurable, empirical welfare analysis relies on the monetary meas-
urement of welfare levels using incomes and prices. This allows for interpersonal com-
parisons and, hence, for redistributions that might improve equity as well as effi  ciency. 
In practice, money-metric effi  ciency analysis is applied through cost-benefi t analysis, 
which helps to evaluate the effi  ciency of a particular economic outcome, or to compare 
the effi  ciency of policy alternatives. A problem with shifting from subjective utility space 
to welfare measured in monetary terms is that estimations need to be made for costs 
and benefi ts that are not priced. This diffi  culty has been solved by including fi ndings of 
willingness to pay surveys. Such surveys result in lists of virtual prices for non-priced 
resources (such as nature) and outcomes (such as a loss of social cohesion), which are 
then used in analyses (Zerbe 2001).
However, as a method of assessing effi  ciency, cost-benefi t analysis has received much 
critique from heterodox schools of thought (see for an accessible discussion Ackerman 
and Heinzerling 2004). It has been viewed as having at least four shortcomings. First, 
income is said to be a poor indicator of well-being across diff erent income classes. This 
makes it likely that the willingness to pay for particular non-priced goods will diff er 
between classes: the poor are less able to pay but in fact may benefi t more from certain 
policies. At the same time, the value of income to people has decreasing marginal returns, 
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so that beyond a certain level of income, subjective well-being no longer improves with 
GDP growth (Easterlin 2001). Money, then, becomes a less reliable measure to assess 
well-being at higher levels of income. Recently, this diffi  culty has been addressed with 
happiness studies, which use surveys ranking self-reported life satisfaction (Frey and 
Stutzer 2002). But whereas happiness studies may fi ll some gaps in cost-benefi t analysis, 
they are designed to assess people’s experienced satisfactions, not their expected satisfac-
tions, and these are still individualistic.
Second, some valued subjective goods simply cannot be measured in monetary terms 
and made commensurable with other valued ends, not even with willingness to pay 
studies. For example, some may enjoy listening to birds in a park but are unable or unwill-
ing to attach a monetary value to this, while others’ satisfaction from consumer goods 
increases with the knowledge that others are worse-off  and declines when neighbours’ 
consumer patterns appear more luxurious than their own. Moreover, not all possible 
eff ects of a policy can be foreseen, due to uncertainties. Even when a project is carried out 
as planned there are likely to remain externalities, feedback eff ects and lock-in situations 
that limit future choices. This, in the words of Richard Wolff  (2004, p. 171), makes ‘effi  -
ciency analysis . . . an illusion’. Others are less pessimistic, but agree that ‘technical opti-
mization is not feasible’ (Alkire 2002, p. 232) because of incommensurabilities between 
priced and non-priced items in cost-benefi t analysis.
Third, compensation is not always possible. This is obviously the case with tragic 
human or environmental losses or the prevention of these. For example, it is simply not 
possible to reduce the number of traffi  c deaths to zero by spending more money on traffi  c 
regulation and control. A dramatic reduction in road accidents requires not only money 
but also changes in behaviours and attitudes, such as no alcohol use when driving; and 
some traffi  c deaths are caused by bad luck and factors beyond our control. Moreover, 
some goods are priceless in a moral sense – how would one, for example, answer a ques-
tion such as ‘For how much would you be willing to change your religion?’ The question 
of how much one is willing to pay for a particular outcome may not only be fi ctitious 
insofar as the payment is concerned, but also rather unrealistic in terms of the desired 
outcome. This puts the whole exercise on shaky ground.
Fourth, even if cost-benefi t analysis is applied at the aggregate level, including a wide 
variety of social costs and benefi ts for a large group of people, its outcome may have 
very unequal distributional eff ects, as Peter Söderbaum (2004) argues. A net benefi t 
accruing to one group may jeopardize human rights, destroy ecological values such as 
biodiversity, or have other irreparable consequences for another group, as is the case in 
the displacement of people for the building of dams. In fact, many cost-benefi t analyses, 
in their eff ort to calculate net outcomes, tend to underestimate negative human impacts 
(Alkire 2002, p. 219).
This critique of cost-benefi t analysis points to the need for other concepts of effi  ciency 
that do not regard markets and prices as neutral. Instead, an understanding of effi  ciency 
is required that does not put effi  ciency and equity in opposition and recognizes that effi  -
ciency cannot escape morality.
Alternative measures of effi  ciency
In heterodox economics, we fi nd two approaches to alternative measures of effi  ciency. 
Neither is as well developed as Pareto effi  ciency, and probably never will be, as 
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both are less formalized, more open and concerned with social as well as individual 
values.
One alternative is that developed in the capability approach of Amartya Sen. It shifts 
the evaluative space from utility to opportunity freedom, while keeping in place the 
consequentialist orientation and the strong no-harm principle of Paretian welfare eco-
nomics. The evaluative criterion is the ‘weak effi  ciency of opportunity-freedom’ defi ned 
as follows: ‘[A] state of aff airs is weakly effi  cient in terms of opportunity-freedom if there 
is no alternative feasible state in which everyone’s opportunity-freedom is surely unwors-
ened and at least one person’s opportunity-freedom is surely expanded’ (Sen 2002, p. 
518). This effi  ciency criterion favours economic outcomes that increase the range and 
signifi cance of the options available to individuals over outcomes that reduce options 
or increase these only for a small group. Sabina Alkire (2002) applied this effi  ciency 
notion to a micro-credit case study. She showed that loans for the poor in developing 
countries may improve people’s options in a variety of ways, ranging from provision 
of more stable incomes to improved self-esteem, stronger supportive social relations 
and more meaningful participation in religious ceremonies. Compared to a cost-benefi t 
analysis evaluation, which is unable to put a monetary value on some of these oppor-
tunity expansions, Alkire argues that the effi  ciency criterion derived from the capability 
approach appears better able to assess incommensurable outcomes and to value these 
in the project participants’ own terms. The effi  ciency gain is not so much monetary, 
although the project needs to fulfi l some basic fi nancial criteria of viability, but in terms 
of human development. It results in the expansion of real and valued opportunities in 
the short run, but also in the long run, because it makes people more participatory in 
the economy.
The second alternative approach starts from the view that effi  ciency has intrinsic value. 
More than half a century ago, home economist Margaret Reid (1934) made this intrinsic 
value of effi  ciency explicit by redefi ning effi  ciency as the minimization of waste: fi rst, the 
waste of means of production (for example, unused land owned by big landowners in 
the presence of landless farmers); second, ineffi  cient production methods (for example, 
household production of food, whereas communal kitchens would generate economies of 
scale); third, production of goods that harm objective well-being (for example, growing 
tobacco rather than food); and fourth, when the rich consume at luxurious levels whereas 
the poor lack a basic standard of living (which keeps the poor below a minimally accept-
able living standard and at a low level of labour productivity).
The strength of Reid’s formulation of effi  ciency as the minimization of waste is that it 
goes beyond the common opposition of effi  ciency and equity: it points out the relation-
ship between the two. This relationship has recently received revived attention, in particu-
lar in the literature on increasing returns (Arthur 1994). At the macro level, for example, 
studies show that GDP growth can benefi t substantially from universal access to educa-
tion for the poor, especially for girls, whose enrolment rates are much lower than those 
of boys in some parts of the world (Klasen 2002). At the micro level, studies show that 
in African farm-households redistribution of land, labour and fertilizer from men’s cash 
crops to women’s food crops increases total household output by 10 to 40 per cent (Udry 
et al. 1995). Finally, ecological economics also draws on the relationship between equity 
and effi  ciency. For example, it has been pointed out how much grain goes to waste in the 
production of meat, which results in less food available for a growing world population 
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(Rifkin 1992). Applications of such more open and less subjective measures of effi  ciency 
make use of complex techniques, most of them multi-criteria methods, taking externali-
ties and other feedback eff ects into account as well as uncertainties by applying a multiple 
stakeholder perspective and using the precautionary principle. Alternative approaches to 
effi  ciency thereby move away from utilitarianism and cost-benefi t analysis and instead 
emphasize substantial well-being outcomes for the population as a whole, in a positional 
analysis, addressing ideological orientations, alternatives and consequences, including 
irreversibilities (Söderbaum 2006).
Conclusion
Effi  ciency is not a value-neutral evaluative criterion. In neoclassical economics, the 
notion of effi  ciency is founded upon a utilitarian ethics with a strong version of the liberal 
no-harm principle. Moreover, it is measured in utility space rather than resource space, so 
it does not guarantee minimization of waste. In heterodox economic traditions, effi  ciency 
has always been regarded as non-neutral and related to equity. Heterodox approaches 
recognize that equity may help to crowd in production and productivity by those who 
otherwise remain without resources and must depend on charity, crime or the state.
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